Refinable priceFINE

Okay FINE I'll buy Intel 2 shares ($40), all I can afford now

$ES $NQ $NQ_F $QQQ calling it a day with just the 1 trade. I usually like to best of 3 but now getting late in day and if I take a loss on next 1 may not get another ( which would be fine except the fact I closed my 1st trade below a 1R so a loss will flip me to -.5 R for day )

Ripple CTO: Bitcoin crash a buying opportunity David Schwartz, Chief Technology Officer (CTO) at Ripple ( $XRP ), outlined on X that he sees this Bitcoin ( $BTC ) crash as a buying opportunity. When an X user asked why should he buy BTC and what can he do with it, Schwartz responded by stating that some Bitcoiners are considering these questions, while other Bitcoiners are not. He added that he’s fine with the views of both groups.

BITCOIN & CRYPTO: YOU ARE BEARISH!!? FINE!!! BUT DON’T TELL ME AGAIN IN 3 YEARS, WHEN BITCOIN HIT $1 MILLION THAT I WAS LUCKY!!!!! I WAS NOT LUCKY!!! I BUY AND HOLD NO MATTER WHAT!! I GRIND EVERY DAY!!!!! PROMOTING BITCOIN FOR 8 YEARS STRAIGHT!! GOOD & BAD TIMES!!!

As the crypto ecosystem held its breath for Ethereum’s Pectra update, an anonymous actor disrupted the test network Sepolia. A subtle attack, exploiting an unexpected vulnerability, revealed issues that question as much as they inform. Decoding an incident that lies halfway between a technical bug and psychological warfare. On March 5, Ethereum deployed Pectra on Sepolia, its latest test network before the official launch. But hardly had the blockchain clock started ticking than error messages flooded the geth nodes. Empty, useless blocks began to accumulate. Marius van der Wijden , a key developer, states: “The attacker turned an ERC-20 feature into a weapon.” Everything hinges on a neglected technical detail: the ERC-20 standard allows token transfers… without tokens. An unknown user sent a 0 token transaction to the Sepolia deposit contract, triggering a cascade of erroneous events. The result? The network began mining empty blocks, like an engine running idle. “We thought it was an internal error, but the address was new, funded via a faucet,”* confides van der Wijden. The attack was deliberate, almost elegant in its simplicity. Yet, the team had anticipated a fix. Too late. The attacker, seemingly reading their minds, re-launched the assault with an identical transaction. “We realized that he might be monitoring our communications,” admits the developer. A race against time began: filtering suspicious transactions without blocking the network. The fix, secretly deployed on a few nodes, ultimately stopped the bleeding. By 2 PM, Sepolia was breathing again. This incident is not just a technical bug. It raises a burning question: how to secure protocols designed to be permissionless against malicious actors who play by their own rules? The exploited vulnerability was not one in the classic sense: ERC-20 was functioning perfectly. It was the interaction between this standard and the specific deposit contract of Sepolia that created a breach. Van der Wijden acknowledges: “We had underestimated this edge case.” An understatement. Because in crypto, “edge cases” are often the playground of attackers. The anonymous individual behind this attack demonstrated a fine understanding of Ethereum’s mechanisms. Their act resembles less a hack than a show of force, a reminder that decentralized networks must anticipate the unpredictable. In the face of this threat, the team adopted a counterintuitive strategy: not to publish the fix. Why? Out of fear that the attacker would adapt their methods. “We discreetly updated our nodes to regain control,” explains van der Wijden. A decision that mixes cybersecurity and mental poker. Because in the crypto space, each correction can become a double-edged weapon if too exposed. Meanwhile, this episode reignites the debate about test networks. Sepolia uses a deposit contract different from the *mainnet*, a peculiarity that limited the damage. But Holesky, tested late February, had already revealed weaknesses . Proof that even blockchain testing grounds require… testing grounds.